Introduction
Commonly associated with the American church-state model,1 a religious free market aims to foster a socio-legal environment where different religions freely compete with one another for followers, without restrictions or distortions imposed by the state.2 This is achieved, at least in theory, through the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees the freedom to conduct religious activities, and through the Establishment Clause, which prohibits the state from tipping the scale in favor of a particular religion.3 The nature of the relationship between state and religion in the religious free market is perhaps best captured by the oft-quoted statement from the U.S. Supreme Court case of Zorach v. Clauson that government should let "each [religious group] flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma."4 Given this attractive image of liberty, free-market competition, religious truth seeking, and purported state neutrality, it is not surprising that the religious free market is a popular normative benchmark for legal scholars in the U.S. and elsewhere.5 Nevertheless, despite frequent references to the religious free market in the legal literature and reliance on the concept, its theoretical development is wanting. Academics evoking the religious free market have rarely elucidated what exactly the concept entails or articulated the assumptions underpinning it. The consensus is that the religious free market requires the legal guarantee arising from the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. But because the desirable normative interpretations of these two clauses differ widely,6 the nature of the resulting market inevitably depends on one's choice of these hotly contested interpretations.
The present article deconstructs the religious free market into the legal components of free exercise, establishment prohibition, and definition of religion. It discusses how the different interpretations and combinations of these legal components affect the religious market. In particular, the analysis highlights two important questions that have been frequently glossed over by advocates of the religious free market: who is entitled to "free competition" and whether in a religious free market religion should be privileged or disadvantaged relative to secular ideologies and beliefs.
The article is organized into five parts. Part II examines the historical evolution, common justifications and critiques of the religious free market as a constitutional principle. Part III sets out the various possible interpretations of the three legal components of the religious free market. Part IV synthesizes the preceding discussions to illustrate the dynamics between these legal components and highlights their implications on the use of religious free market as a normative guiding principle. Part V concludes the discussion.
2
Intellectual History of the Religious Free Market
2.1
Historical Origin The concept of the religious free market has a long and distinguished pedigree. Government regulations have little or no place in the free market of religion. It is therefore not surprising that the religious free market can be traced back to Adam Smith.7 In both "The Wealth of Nations"8 and "The Theory of Moral Sentiments,"9 Adam Smith applied market principles to religious enterprise. His general disdain of state monopolies was reflected in his critique of the inefficient European state-sponsored religious monopolies, such as the Church of England or the established Catholic and Lutheran Churches in continental Europe. 10 Although Adam Smith became better known for his expositions on economics, his ideas on religious free market gained traction among contemporaneous intellectuals across the Atlantic. James Madison's views on religious liberty reflected the religious free market.11 Commentators have frequently argued that the promotion of a religious free market was part of the American Founders' intentions in drafting the Constitution.12 Although the primacy of religion and Christianity were frequently invoked by key patriots,13 there was general consensus to avoid the religious establishment of England.14 Free competition between religions, with minimal interference from the federal government, was a useful tool for resolving the tensions and conflicts of interests between the various Protestant sects and the strands of deisms in America during the founding era.15
2.2
Modern Revival The religious free market principle did not prevent the de facto establishment of Protestant Christianity in the U.S. 
2.3
Common Justifications Such popularity is not surprising given the arguments in favor of the religious free market. These arguments are often related to one another but not always consistent with each other. They can be broadly categorized based on whether religious free competition is an end in itself or a means to achieve other normative goals.
The former category contains the justification based on religious liberty,28 often considered as a core human right29 and an important, perhaps the most important right protected under the U.S. Constitution.30 Religious liberty is safeguarded under the principle of the religious free market by the prohibition journal of law, religion and state 3 (2014) 1-24 The other important line of justification for the religious free market has a more functional orientation. It assumes religion is good and it focuses on how the religious free market benefits religion. There are two manifestations of this approach. The first one is the promotion of religiosity. Commentators have often identified the separation of church and state in the U.S. (i.e., the Establishment Clause) as the reason for the higher religiosity of the American35 than of the European population.36 This view is echoed in sociological studies of religion, which argue that the religious free market promotes religiosity37 and use market analogies to explain how overregulation limits religious choices and supply, which in turn reduces the consumption of religion.38
The second functional justification focuses on facilitation of religious truth seeking. Resembling the "marketplace of ideas" rationale supporting the freedom of speech, which envisages the emergence of objective truth amidst free competition with opposing ideas,39 religious truth is more likely to be widely accepted40 if religion is allowed to "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma."41 Religious free competition also produces religious doctrines that best suit the times and circumstances.42 Conversely, "informed" religious choice is impeded by restrictions on religious propagation and proselytization.43 Note that the religious truth-seeking rationale is also commonly featured in arguments for religious liberty.44
2.4
Preliminary Critique The religious free market is not without its controversies. Freston noted that "some Pentecostal proselytizers appear to want the freedom to 'win' and then close down religious freedom."49 Nevertheless, the hypocrisies and inconsistent behaviors of the purported advocates of the religious free market are not evidence of the shortcomings of the religious free market as a normative ideal. More problematic is the fact that the advocates of the religious free market do not always share the same assumptions about religious liberty or the normative goals that the religious free market is intended to facilitate. The role of government regulations in the religious free market is also ambiguous. For example, the concept of the religious free market has been used to argue both for and against restrictions of religious speech. Douglas Laycock cited the religious truth-seeking aspect of the religious free market to argue against restrictions on government funding of private religious speech.50 By contrast, Richard Delgado recommended 
To compound the ambiguity of the nature of religious free competition envisaged under the religious free market, the importance of religious truth seeking is not universally shared by all religions. Some religions are not predicated on truth claims,55 as for example Hinduism,56 journal of law, religion and state 3 (2014) 1-24 A full critical inquiry into the normative desirability of the religious free market and a comprehensive analysis of all its various assumptions are beyond the scope of this article, which aims to contribute to the understanding of this otherwise popular concept by demonstrating how the legal framework of Establishment and Free Exercise clauses can produce different and even conflicting manifestations of the religious free market. The tension between these competing conceptions and assumptions is reflected in the contested interpretations of free exercise, establishment, and the definition of religion.
3
The Legal Components
Free Exercise: The Highs and Lows of Free Exercise Protection
The guarantee of free exercise is necessary for free competition between religions. If members of a religion are legally impeded from performing their religious practices or propagating its teachings, the religion is naturally disadvantaged in the religious marketplace vis-à-vis other religions that do not face such impediments. Most would agree that it is unconstitutional for legal impediments to target a specific religion or religious practice qua religion.62 ), where a city ban on "ritual slaughter" is invalidated because it is targeted at a particular religious groups, amidst animosity toward that group. Nevertheless, it is possible to envisage its unconstitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause, with religion a seemingly uncontroversial candidate as a protected class: Caroline Mala Corbin, "Nonbelievers and Government Speech", 97 from generally applicable law. Under article 9(2), the right to religious practice is subjected to laws necessary for public safety, public order, health and morals, or the rights of others. The European Court of Human Rights adopted a balancing approach in resolving this question.68 But limiting strategies such as religiously motivated/compelled distinctions and core/peripheral distinctions have been used by the European and domestic courts to defeat claims of religious exemptions and increase the de facto threshold for religious exemptions.69 From the perspective of the religious free market, a high standard of free exercise protection is not always necessary for religious free competition. If the impediments to religion in neutral, generally-applicable laws are truly random and unaffected by insidious religious discrimination, all religions are equally subject to the increased risk of legal impediments under a lower standard of free exercise protection. The disproportionate burden suffered by a religion under a particular law is evened out over time and over the entire spectrum of laws.
There is a legitimate concern that the burdens of facially neutral, generally applicable laws are usually not random in actual practice. The needs of the religious minority are frequently overlooked by the political majority.70 At the same time, majority and mainline religions are more likely to automatically enjoy legislated exemptions in the legislative process.71 Although members of a political minority are not necessarily incapable of obtaining legal exemptions,72 it is reasonable to question whether this is sufficient on a systematic level given the common history of religious minorities actively being targeted for legal sanctions and impediments.73 In these circumstances, a level playing field for minority religions may require a higher standard of free exercise enforced by the judiciary.74 Even if one rules out insidious or subconscious religious discrimination in the lawmaking process, the conclusion that religious free competition is unimpeded by a lower standard of free exercise protection is based on the assumption that the relevant competitors are religions and do not include secular views. This assumption is not shared by Michael W. McConnell and Richard A. Posner in their economic analysis of religious freedom.75 The preference or non-preference of religion vis-à-vis secular views is a hotly disputed aspect of the Religion Clauses and has important implications for the religious free market.
3.2
Establishment: What Sort of Neutrality Do We Really Want? The guarantee of free exercise anchors religious liberty as a foundational ingredient of religious free competition, but it is the Establishment Clause that distinguishes the religious free market. It is open to dispute whether the prohibition of state support, subsidy, or establishment of religion is necessary to guarantee religious liberty.76 The European Commission on Human Rights did not regard the establishment of a state religion as a violation of religious freedom.77 Some U.S. scholars have also argued that not all state endorsements of the majority's religious traditions diminish religious liberty, especially in the absence of coercion.78 But if the goal is a religious free market, state religious establishment (e.g., the subsidies and support provided to a religion by the state) poses a real risk of distorting the supply and consumption of religions.79 Establishment can also indirectly frustrate religious competition "by creating a journal of law, religion and state 3 (2014) 1-24 80 Eisgruber (n 2), 467-468. 81
See Koppelman (n 36), 1837; Woudenberg (n 14), 320-321 ("arbitrary and inconsistent"); Garry (n 12), 129 ("decades of inconsistent jurisprudence"); Posner (n 38), 950 ("Some of these efforts are held to violate the Establishment Clause, others not; there is no discernible pattern or crisp legal standard."); Fowler et al. (n 66), 261 ("Taken as a whole, Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the twentieth century amounted to nothing more than a confusing mess to many observers"). Posner's economic analysis of religious freedom is based on the notion that religions and non-religions should be placed on equal footing.82 This argument represents the "substantive neutrality" principle, in which the "state must often treat religious activities as it treats comparable secular activities to maintain evenhandedness, but it must avoid endorsing any particular religion or religion (or secularism) in general."83 Calvin Massey observed that "substantive neutrality" is the position of the current U.S. Supreme Court.84
3.2.2
Accomodationism It is possible to conceive of the religious free market perspective as requiring free competition only between religions. This conclusion is reached under the accommodationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause. According to this view, the Establishment Clause requires only that the state be neutral with regard to religions.85 The government is entitled to prefer religion in general over non-religion from both the legal and normative perspectives. The legal argument holds that the constitutional structure grants a special status and preference to religion when it specifically provides for the guarantee of religious liberty among the various spheres of human activity.86 The normative argument bases the general preference for religion on the unique social values of religion. 87 Regardless of the merits of these arguments,88 the concern of the religious free market is that preferential treatment extended by the state to religion in general will turn into preferential treatment of the dominant religion.89 Jonathan Gruber and Daniel M. Hungerman conducted an empirical study on Sunday closing laws in the U.S. and suggested that "repealing the [Sunday closing] laws causes a reduction in religious participation along both the giving and going margins."90 But if the theory is that Sunday closing laws help religions "enforce the rules of their 'club,'" and that repealing these laws hurts those religions,91 the opposite is true as well. Sunday closing laws favor dominant religions to the detriment of the minority religions with different rest days.92
3.2.3
Strict Separationist Interestingly, the principle that requires free competition only between religions can be supported by the interpretation that is most opposed by the accommodationists. Under the strict separationist approach, almost all forms of state support for religion are prohibited. 93 In an era of expanded government (welfare state), religions may be disadvantaged vis-à-vis secular views and values from a practical perspective.94 While competition between religions is not distorted, this approach will result in government-created incentives to withdraw from the religious market altogether. Therefore, the strict separationist approach has been criticized for promoting a secular ideology. Substantive Definition One approach to defining religion is through substantive or content-based definitions.99 Echoing the unique value justification of religions for the accommodationist approach, this rationale argues that First Amendment protection should be restricted to beliefs with extra-temporal implications.100 The main criticism of this approach is that it may prejudicially exclude religions and religious practices that are not well understood or that contradict the judges' own perspectives on religion.101 This approach may also lead to the exclusion of non-Western faiths.102 Relying on the works of Roy Clouser, Julia Stronks explained how uncontroversial religions do not fit into the typical, widelyaccepted definition of religions. For example, Shintoism does not fit the criterion of "religion as an ethical code;" Buddhism and Hinduism do not fit the criterion of "religion must include worship;" Hinduism and Buddhism do not fit the criterion of "religion must include a Supreme Being."103 Indeed, nonWestern religions were not even considered religions in the past.104 A substantive definition that includes all the religions in the relevant polity will at least preserve the religious free market for existing religions. Nevertheless, there may be a discriminatory effect against emerging religious movements that bear little resemblance to existing religions. separationist approach toward the Establishment Clause unworkable. If the bulk of secular perspectives are deemed religious, there is almost nothing the state could do without running afoul of the prohibition against state support for "religion." Conversely, including secularly motivated consciences in the category of religion transforms the accommodationist preference for religion into neutral treatment of religion and secular beliefs that characterizes the substantive neutrality principle. This dynamic is illustrated by Jeremy Webber, who argues that freedom of religion requires the freedom to be based on the affirmative valuing of religion. Webber, however, is prepared to extend the freedom to non-religious conscientious beliefs on the grounds that they are analogous to religion.110 In this aspect, the substantive neutrality approach toward the Establishment Clause is indifferent to the definition of religion because no legal advantages or disadvantages arise from the classification of religion.
The Different Religious Free Markets
In sum, although the guarantee of free exercise and the prohibition against establishment are necessary to constitute a religious free market, the different interpretations of the clauses and their various combinations have different effects on the resulting religious market. The differences revolve around two central issues: who is entitled to "free competition" and should religion be privileged relative to secular ideologies and beliefs? Table 1 summarizes how the various combinations of the different legal components affect the final religious market. Table 1 illustrates the material divergence of the resulting religious free market. Religions competing freely against one another while given general preferential treatment over secular beliefs is but one possible conceptualization of the religious free market. A religious market that places religions at a general disadvantage relative to secular beliefs would qualify as free vis-à-vis religions as well, even it is arguably subversive to the original intention of the American Founders.111 The apparent divergence arises because the baseline of competition in the religious free market is often not unarticulated. Although religious free competition requires granting maximum freedom to religious practices, tensions inevitably arise when some of the religions are unintentionally disadvantaged. Generally applicable laws can hamper religious activities, but the granting of religious exemptions involves a notoriously difficult balancing between administrative workability, public interests, and religious liberty.112 Similarly, the real danger of political bias in the granting of purportedly neutral government aid113 may justify the strict separationists' total exclusion of government aid to religions in order to ensure a level playing field. But the reality of an ever-increasing government sphere renders this approach detrimental to religions in practice. 114 Another observation derived from Table 1 has to do with neutrality, or parity between religions and secular beliefs. An approach of substantive neutrality toward the Establishment Clause almost always results in a religious market in which secular beliefs and religions are on a level playing field. Defining religions in a way that includes secular beliefs also guarantees that there is no advantage to either religion or secular beliefs in the resulting religious market. The definition of religions is also less problematic under recent international and domestic constitutional documents that tend to be broadly worded to include non-theistic beliefs.115 Nevertheless, there often remain subtle but important distinctions between religion and secular beliefs. For example, although Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights includes non-religious "thought" and "conscience," anti-discrimination protection is restricted to religions only.116
The Different Baseline of Competition

4.2
Who is Really Entitled to Free Competition? The issue of definition is particularly important in the context of the religious free market and of religious liberty in general. The entitlements of free competition and liberty hinge on the belief being classified as "religious." Reasonable people may disagree about whether a secular belief is entitled to equal treatment with a religious belief, but history is replete with examples of discriminatory exclusions. Although Rhode Island was one of the few prerevolutionary colonies that did not have an established church, its social climate was not much different from that of its Puritan neighbors, in which Roman Catholics and Jews were denied citizenship.117 Similar patterns occurred in historical England as well. The Act of Toleration that provided relief for most Protestant dissenters continued to exclude Catholics, Jews, and atheists from the protection of religious liberty and equality.118 When John Locke advocated religious liberty and freedom of conscience, Muslims and atheists were not considered to be beneficiaries of such rights. 119 In modern times, traditional African religions are excluded from interfaith cooperation between Muslims and Christians in Sierra Leone, although traditionalists make up 30% of the population, because Muslim and Christian leaders do not treat traditional religions as "real" religions. 120 The religious free market can be a dangerously ambiguous concept if there is no clear identification of the appropriate perimeter of the market and of the market participants.
4.3
Dynamics of Mix and Match Table 1 also reveals how various combinations of the legal interpretations can produce surprising dynamics in the resulting religious market. It is possible to envisage that the restricted ability to seek religious exemptions from generally applicable law under weak free exercise protection can disadvantage religions as a whole in the resulting religious market, but the opposite can be achieved if the weak free exercise protection is coupled with an accommodative interpretation of the Establishment Clause and with a definition of religion that excludes secular beliefs. Similarly, a strict separationist approach in the Establishment Clause is not necessarily the anti-thesis of religions, as opponents commonly claim.121 A balanced approach towards religions and secular beliefs can still be achieved if the strict separationist approach in Establishment Clause is paired with strong free exercise protection.
4.4
Implications Hence, it is crucial to appreciate that the devil is really in the details. The complex dynamics between the various legal components can materially alter the resulting religious market. Two takeaways emerge. First, it is of paramount importance to articulate the perimeters of religious free competition that the legal regime intends to impose before the religious free market can adequately serve as a guiding principle for the law. Reflecting the tension between functional and "end-in-itself" justifications for the religious free market,122 advocates for the religious free market can reasonably differ about whether secular beliefs are entitled to free competition and whether religions should be privileged as a whole, among other possible variations. Those who are more receptive to the functional justifications naturally incline toward a legal regime that adopts a strong free exercise protection, an accommodative approach toward the Establishment Clause, and a definition of religion that excludes secular belief. This may ultimately be desirable on various normative grounds,123 but the religious free market will not be one of them. This potent combination that reserves the right to free competition only to religions, to which it grants enormous preferential treatment over secular beliefs, is but one of the many plausible religious free markets. The converse is true for those who adopt a more skeptical view of religion124 or a more "end-in-itself" justification for the religious free market.
The second takeaway is that the creation of the religious free market requires a holistic assessment of all the various legal components. The contours of the resulting free market are shaped by the combinations and interactions of these legal components. The emphasis of a particular clause is not sufficient for achieving one's desired, and, one hopes, articulated version of the religious free market. It is easy to win a battle (e.g., arguing for accommodative interpretation of the Establishment Clause to give preferential treatment to religion in the religious market) and lose the war (e.g., when the playing field with secular beliefs is leveled back by a definition of religion that includes secular beliefs).
Conclusion
Projecting an image of liberty, religious truth seeking, and state neutrality, the religious free market is an attractive normative benchmark for law and religion
